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This paper shows how rational investors can have different degrees of optimism regarding the prospects
of the economy, even if they share exactly the same information regarding all economic fundamentals.
The key is that heterogeneity in expectations regarding endogenous outcomes can emerge as a purely
self-fulfilling equilibrium property when investment choices are strategic complements. This in turn
has interesting novel positive and normative implications for a wide class of models that feature such
complementarities: (i) It can rationalize idiosyncratic investor sentiment. (ii) It can be the source of
significant heterogeneity in real and financial investment choices, even in the absence of any heterogeneity
in individual characteristics and despite the presence of a strong incentive to coordinate on the same
course of action. (iii) It can sustain rich fluctuations in aggregate investment and asset prices, including
fluctuations that are smoother than those often associated with multiple-equilibria models. (iv) It can
capture the idea that investors learn slowly how to coordinate on a certain course of action. (v) It can
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Going back to Keynes, many have argued that animal spirits, market sentiments, or other forms of
extrinsic uncertainty can be the cause of aggregate ﬂuctuations.1 In this paper I argue that extrinsic
uncertainty can be largely idiosyncratic and can therefore also be the source of heterogeneity in real
and ﬁnancial investment choices. In so doing, I propose a rational theory of idiosyncratic investor
sentiment. I then explore some novel positive and normative implications.
I conduct this exercise within two closely related models. The ﬁrst is a simple real investment
game that abstracts from ﬁnancial prices. The second is a variant that stylizes trading in ﬁnancial
markets. The common essential feature of the two models is that they allow for strategic comple-
mentarity in investment choices: an individual investor is more willing to invest when he expects
others also to invest. Such a complementarity could originate in a variety of production, demand,
thick-market, or credit-related externalities analyzed in prior work.
To deliver the central result of this paper in its sharpest form, I rule out any exogenous source of
heterogeneity: all investors have identical preferences, face identical constraints, and share the same
information about exogenous productivity and all other relevant economic fundamentals. These
assumptions ensure that all investors would choose exactly the same level of investment if their
choices had been strategically independent. One may expect this conclusion not to be aﬀected by
the presence of a complementarity in investment choices: if all investors ﬁnd it optimal to make
the same choice when they do not care about one another’s choices, why should they do anything
diﬀerent when they only have a desire to align their choices with one another? Yet, there now exist
equilibria in which identical investors make diﬀerent investment choices.
The key to this apparent paradox is that individual investors may now face idiosyncratic extrinsic
uncertainty about the aggregate level of investment. That is, if we take a snapshot of the economy at
any given point, we will ﬁnd diﬀerent investors holding diﬀerent expectations regarding endogenous
economic outcomes, even though they hold identical expectations regarding all exogenous economic
fundamentals. This idiosyncratic variation in “optimism” regarding the endogenous prospects of the
economy requires neither any diﬀerences in information regarding fundamentals nor any deviation
from Bayesian rationality; rather, it emerges as a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
1The role of extrinsic uncertainty has been formalized within two related but distinct classes of models: overlapping
generations economies (e.g., Azariadis, 1981, Azariadis and Guesnerie, 1986) and models with complementarities
(e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 1984, Obstfeld, 1986; Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar, 1993; Cooper and John, 1988,
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Matsuyama, 1991; Weill, 1989).
1Formally, this is achieved by the introduction of “private sunspots”. Like the public sunspots
used in previous work, the private sunspots considered in this paper are payoﬀ-irrelevant random
variables. But unlike public sunspots, private sunspots are only imperfectly correlated across agents
and are privately observed by them. The equilibria that obtain with private sunspots are thus closely
related to the correlated equilibria introduced in game theory by Aumann (1974, 1987): when there
are endogenous prices, the equilibria considered in this paper are hybrids of correlated equilibria
and rational-expectations equilibria.
As an example, one could imagine the agents measuring the brightness of the sun or the tem-
perature outside their houses; idiosyncratic measurement error could then be a natural source of
imperfect correlation. Alternatively, one could imagine the agents reading a newspaper in search
of clues about what action other agents are likely to coordinate on; the choice of what newspaper
to read, or the interpretation of what any given newspaper says, could then be somewhat idiosyn-
cratic. However, one need not take these examples too literally. Rather, one should think of private
sunspots as modeling devices that permit the construction of equilibria in which diﬀerent investors
have diﬀerent degrees of optimism regarding the endogenous prospects of the economy.
One interpretation is that private sunspots rationalize idiosyncratic investor sentiment; another
is that they capture, in a certain sense, idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding which equilibrium is
played. Indeed, while the pertinent work has been criticized for assuming away the possibility that
each individual agent may be uncertain what action other agents are trying to coordinate, private
sunspots address this issue at its heart by generating such uncertainty as an integral feature of the
equilibrium. But no matter what interpretation one gives to private sunspots, there is a number of
novel positive and normative implications that they deliver.
On the positive front, I highlight that models with macroeconomic complementarities can gener-
ate signiﬁcant heterogeneity in real and ﬁnancial investment choices. Such heterogeneity can obtain
even in the absence—or after controlling for—any heterogeneity in exogenous individual characteris-
tics, but only to the extent that individual incentives depend strongly enough on forecasts of others’
choices. It is thus symptomatic of the “beauty-contest” character of ﬁnancial and real investment
emphasized by Keynes.
Furthermore, I show how introducing idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty can signiﬁcantly enrich,
not only the cross-sectional, but also the aggregate outcomes of these models. In the two models
considered in this paper, with public sunspots aggregate investment and asset prices can only take
2two extreme values (“high” and “low”); with private sunspots, instead, aggregate investment and
asset prices can follow smooth stochastic processes spanning the entire interval between these two
extreme values. Private sunspots can thus generate much smoother aggregate ﬂuctuations than
public sunspots, indeed ﬂuctuations that are more reminiscent of unique-equilibria models.
On the normative front, I show that ignoring private sunspots may lead to erroneous welfare
and policy conclusions. The models considered in this paper feature exactly two equilibria in the
absence of sunspots: a “good” (Pareto-dominant) one in which everybody invests; and a “bad” one in
which nobody invests. Adding public sunspots only randomizes among those two extreme levels of
investment, achieving convex combinations of the welfare obtained in the two sunspot-less equilibria.
Therefore, as long as one restricts attention to public sunspots, one can safely draw two conclusions:
that the occurrence of an investment crash is prima-facia evidence of coordination failure; and that
policy interventions that preclude this outcome (at no or small cost) are bound to improve welfare.
Neither conclusion is warranted once one allows for private sunspots. Suppose, in particular,
that the aggregate level of investment in the “good” equilibrium is excessive relative to the ﬁrst
best. Then one can construct an equilibrium with private sunspots in which the economy ﬂuctuates
between states during which only a subset of the investors invest (“normal times”) and states during
which nobody invests (“crashes”). Because the aggregate level of investment is now closer to the
ﬁrst-best level during normal times, this equilibrium can achieve higher welfare than the equilibrium
where everybody invests. However, for certain individuals to have an incentive not to invest during
normal times, it must be that these individuals believe that a crash will take place with suﬃciently
high probability, while many other individuals believe the opposite. But then note that, as long as
agents are rational, such heterogeneity in beliefs is possible in equilibrium only if crashes do happen
with positive probability.
Therefore, an occasional crash—what looks as apparent coordination failure—is actually boost-
ing welfare by facilitating idiosyncratic uncertainty and thereby providing the necessary incentive
that keeps investment from being excessive during normal times. It then also follows that well-
intended policies that aim at preventing apparent coordination failures could actually reduce welfare
by eliminating the aforementioned incentive.
Related literature. The literature on macroeconomic complementarities, coordination failures,
and sunspots is voluminous. Key contributions include Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie
(1986), Benhabib and Farmer (1984), Cass and Shell (1983), Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar
3(1993), Cooper and John (1988), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Guesnerie and Woodford (1992),
Howitt and McAfee (1992), Kiyotaki (1988), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Matsuyama (1991), Ob-
stfeld (1986, 1996), and Woodford (1986, 1987, 1991).2 None of these earlier works considers
idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty. Although this paper uses only a highly stylized representative
of this class of models, it clearly illustrates how the introduction of such uncertainty can enrich the
cross-sectional and aggregate outcomes of these models, as well as their welfare implications.
In so doing, the paper builds on Aumann’s (1974, 1987) seminal work on correlated equilibria.
Although the main contribution is to identify a set of positive and normative implications that
have not been considered by prior applied work, a secondary contribution is to show how imperfect
correlation can be accommodated within rational-expectations equilibria. The conceptual issue
here is that equilibrium prices convey information about the underlying common components of the
imperfect correlation devices that diﬀerent agents observe, so that each agent’s beliefs about these
sunspots are endogenous to the strategies of other agents. This introduces a ﬁxed-point element
between beliefs and strategies that is absent in standard correlated equilibria.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model
and revisits the set of equilibria with public sunspots. Section 3 introduces private sunspots and
studies their positive implications. Section 4 studies a variant model that captures trading in
ﬁnancial markets. Section 5 turns to normative implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The baseline model: a real investment game
The economy is populated by a measure-1 continuum of agents (investors), who are indexed by
i 2 [0;1], are endowed with one unit of wealth each, and decide how to allocate this wealth between
a safe technology and a risky alternative. The safe technology delivers a return R no matter
what, while the return of the risky technology depends on the aggregate level of investment in that
technology. The payoﬀ of investor i is given by
i = (ki;K)  (1   ki)R + ki(R + A(K)) = R + A(K)ki;
where ki denotes investor i’s investment in the risky technology, K denotes the aggregate level of
investment, and A(K) the excess return of this technology relative to the safe one.
2See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) and Cooper (1999) for excellent reviews.
4The key assumption needed for the positive results of this paper is that there exists a  2 (0;1)
such that A(K) < 0 for all K <  and A(K) > 0 for all K > . This assumption introduces
strategic complementarity in investment choices and guarantees the existence of two Nash equilibria,
one where all agents invest their entire wealth in the risky technology and another where all agents
invest their entire wealth in the safe technology. To simplify the analysis, I henceforth normalize
R = 0 and let A(K) =  c < 0 for K <  and A(K) = b   c > 0 for K  , where b > c > 0.
One can then think of c as parameterizing the cost of investing in the risky technology,  as the
minimal level of aggregate investment for which the technology becomes proﬁtable, and b as the
gross beneﬁt enjoyed in that event.3 I further assume that investment is indivisible: each investor
can choose either ki = 1 (which I henceforth call simply “invest”) or ki = 0 (“don’t invest”), so that
K is also the mass of agents investing.4
Model interpretation. This model can be interpreted as a highly stylized version of a variety
of models considered in prior applied work. The core element is the presence of strategic comple-
mentarity in individual production, investment, or portfolio choices. Such complementarity could
originate in a plethora of production, demand, or thick-market externalities, as well as in credit
frictions.5 For the purposes of this paper, modeling the deeper foundations of such complementar-
ity is not essential. What is essential is only that such complementarity opens the door to extrinsic
uncertainty. Note, however, that the framework introduced so far abstracts from how prices (or
other signals of aggregate activity) may limit idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty, a possibility that
is evidently relevant for most applications of interest. I will deal with this issue in Section 4.
Public sunspots. As noted above, the model admits exactly two equilibria in the absence of
sunspots. To see this, note that, in the absence of sunspots, the aggregate level of investment is
deterministic,6 and the best response of investor i is simply




1 if K  
0 if K < 
3All these parameters are common knowledge—there is no uncertainty about the economic fundamentals.
4Indivisibility has no bite here because agents are risk neutral.
5See, for example, Diamond (1976) for thick-market externalities; Kiyotaki (1988) and Woodford (1991) for ag-
gregate demand externalities; Azariadis and Smith (1998), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Matsuyama (2007) for
complementarities due to credit frictions; Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar (1993) for complementarities in business
formation; Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Obstfeld (1986, 1996) for coordinated bank runs and currency attacks;
and Cooper (1999) for an excellent review of the role of complementarities in macroeconomics.
6Because there is a continuum of investors, this is true even if investors follow mixed strategies.
5It follows that all investors necessarily make the same choice and there exist exactly two equilibria:
one in which everybody invests (ki = K = 1 for all i) and another in which nobody invests
(ki = K = 0 for all i).7 The one equilibrium is sustained by the self-fulﬁlling expectation that
everybody will invest; the other by the self-fulﬁlling expectation that nobody will invest. In either
case, investors face no uncertainty about what choices other investors are making and perfectly
coordinate on the same course action.
Now let us introduce public sunspots. Before investors make their choices, they publicly observe
a payoﬀ-irrelevant random variable s, whose support is S  R and whose cumulative distribution
function (c.d.f.) is F : S ! [0;1]. Because the investors can now follow strategies that are contingent
on s, the aggregate level of investment can be stochastic. However, because s is publicly observed,
the investors continue to face no uncertainty about the equilibrium level of investment and continue
to make identical choices. As a result, equilibria with public sunspots are merely lotteries over the
two sunspot-less equilibria.
Proposition 1 For any equilibrium with public sunspots, there exists a p 2 [0;1] such that K(s) = 1
with probability p and K(s) = 0 with probability 1   p. Conversely, for any p 2 [0;1], there exists
an equilibrium in which K(s) = 1 with probability p and K(s) = 0 with probability 1   p.
Beliefs and actions vary across equilibria, or across realizations of the public sunspot, but never in
the cross-section of investors: in any given equilibrium and for any given realization of the sunspot,
all investors share the same “sentiment” (i.e., the same belief about all endogenous outcomes), can
perfectly forecast one another’s choices, and end up taking exactly the same action. The next
section shows how none of these properties need to hold once we allow for private sunspots.
3 Private sunspots and idiosyncratic sentiment
I introduce private sunspots as follows. First, “Nature” draws a payoﬀ-irrelevant random variable
s that is not observed by any investor. The support of this variable is S  R and its c.d.f. is
F : S ! [0;1]. Then, each investor privately observes a payoﬀ-irrelevant random variable m.
Conditional on s, m is i.i.d. across investors, with support M  R and c.d.f. 	 : M  S ! [0;1].
7When A() = 0, there also exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in each investor invests with probability ;
aggregate investment is then  and investors are indeed indiﬀerent between investing and not investing so long as
A() = 0. I have ruled out this equilibrium by assuming A() 6= 0. This, however, is not essential for any of the
results.
6These variables deﬁne what I call “private sunspots”: they are private signals of the underlying
unobserved common sunspot s: I henceforth call (S;F;M;	) the “sunspot structure” and deﬁne an
equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium with private sunspots consists of a sunspot structure (S;F;M;	) and
a measurable strategy k : M ! f0;1g such that




(k;K(s))dP(sjm) 8m 2 M;
with K(s) =
R
M k(m)d	(mjs) 8s 2 S, and with P(sjm) denoting the c.d.f. of the posterior about s
conditional on m (as implied by Bayes’ rule).
Note that the sunspot structure (S;F;M;	) is not part of the exogenous primitives of the
environment. Rather, it is a modeling device that permits the construction of equilibria that sustain
endogenous stochastic variation, not only in the aggregate, but also in the cross-section of agents.
In the remainder of this section, I consider a speciﬁc Gaussian sunspot structure that best illustrates
the novel positive properties equilibria with private sunspots can lead to.
Gaussian sunspots. Suppose s is drawn form a Normal distribution with mean s 2 R and
variance 2
s > 0. The private signal observed by investor i is mi = s + "i; where "i is Normal
noise, i.i.d. across investors and independent of s, with variance 2
" > 0. One can then think
of s as the “brightness of the sun” or the “average temperature in a city” and "i as idiosyncratic
measurement error. The next proposition then constructs equilibria where an investor invests if and
only if his private measurement of the brightness of the sun or the temperature is suﬃciently high.
In these equilibria, an investor’s private sunspot captures his idiosyncratic sentiment regarding the
prospects of the economy: the higher m, the higher the investor’s expectation of the aggregate level
of investment.
Proposition 2 For any (s;s;"), there exists an equilibrium in which the following are true:
(i) An investor invests when m > m and not when m < m, for some m 2 R.
(ii) The aggregate level of investment is stochastic, with full support on (0;1).
(iii) The cross-sectional distribution of expectations regarding the aggregate level of investment,
E[Kjm]; has full support on (0;1).
7Proof. Let  denote the c.d.f. of the standard Normal distribution. Suppose there exists an
m such that an investor invests if and only if m > m. Aggregate investment is then given by






and therefore K (s)   if and only if s  s; where
s = m + " 1(): (2)
Because both the prior about s and the signal m are Gaussian, the posterior about s conditional on m










s s and variance Var[sjm] = ( 2
s + 2
" ) 1.
It follows that the expected return from investing conditional on signal m is



















Note that the latter is strictly increasing in m: For the proposed strategy to be part of an equilibrium,



















Substituting s from condition (2) into (3) and rearranging gives
















which completes the proof of part (i). Part (ii) then follows from condition (1). Finally, part (iii)
follows from part (ii) along with the fact that both the distribution of s conditional on m and that
of m conditional on s have full supports. QED
Note that diﬀerent investors hold diﬀerent expectations about the distribution of the signals
m in the population. In the equilibria constructed above, this means that diﬀerent investors also
hold diﬀerent expectations about the mass of investors who have received m  m. The end result
is diﬀerent expectations about the aggregate level of investment, which in turn sustain diﬀerent
individual investment choices—a sharp diﬀerence from the case with public sunspots.
8Because this heterogeneity in expectations and choices can not be traced to any heterogeneity
in primitive characteristics (preferences, endowments, technologies, or payoﬀ-relevant information),
it can be interpreted as idiosyncratic variation in “sentiment” or “optimism”. This optimism is
with regard to the endogenous prospects of the economy. It does not require any heterogeneity
in expectations regarding the exogenous primitives of the environment, nor any deviation from
Bayesian rationality. Rather, it is merely, and purely, a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium property.
Finally, note that, in the equilibria constructed above, the aggregate level of investment has
full support on the (0;1) interval. In contrast, in the equilibria with no or only public sunspots,
the aggregate level of investment could take only the extreme values 0 and 1. Therefore, private
sunspots permit, not only endogenous heterogeneity in the cross-section of the population, but also
a richer set of aggregate outcomes.
A simple dynamic extension. To better appreciate the aggregate implications of private
sunspots, consider the following dynamic extension. There is an inﬁnite number of periods. In
each period t; each investor choses whether to invest (kt = 1) or not (kt = 0). He then receives a
contemporaneous payoﬀ t = A(Kt)kt, where Kt is the aggregate level of investment in period t
and A(Kt) is the net return to investment, with A(Kt) = b   c > 0 if Kt   and A(Kt) =  c < 0
if Kt < : The investor’s intertemporal payoﬀ is simply
P1
t=0 tt, where  2 (0;1):
The sunspot structure is wherein the interesting dynamics enter. The unobserved sunspot in
period t is given by st = st 1 + ut, where  2 (0;1) is the auto-correlation in the sunspot and ut
is white noise, i.i.d. across time, with variance 2
u: The private sunspot observed by an investor in
period t is mt = st + "t; where "t is white noise, i.i.d. across agents and time, with variance 2
":
Now note that investors may learn over time about past realized sunspots by the observation
of past aggregate investment and/or past payoﬀs. To maintain the analysis tractable, I ignore
the learning through payoﬀs. I also assume that investors observe noisy private signals of past
investment: each investor observes in period t a signal xt =  1(Kt 1) + t;where t is white
noise, i.i.d. across agents and time, with variance 2
: These assumptions guarantee the existence of
equilibria in which the information structure remains Gaussian.8
8The assumption that investors do not learn from their past payoﬀs is merely for convenience and can be justiﬁed
as follows. Let the payoﬀ of an investor be t = ztkt; where zt  A(Kt)+!t and where !t is white noise, i.i.d. across
both time and agents, with variance 
2
!: Suppose further that zt is privately observed by the investor, independently
of his choice of investment; this kills the value for experimentation that would have emerged if zt was observed only
when kt = 1: Then, the observation of t conveys no more information than zt; which by itself is a noisy private signal
of Kt. Qualitatively, this is much alike the noisy private signal xt that we have already introduced. The only diﬀerence
is that the information contained zt is not Gaussian, making the updating of beliefs intractable. However, letting
9Indeed, as shown in the Appendix, we can ﬁnd a sequence fm
t;tg
1
t=0 and an equilibrium in
which the following hold: (i) the entire sequence of private signals up to period t can be summarized
in a suﬃcient statistic ~ mt, which is Normal, i.i.d. across investors, with mean s and variance 2
t;
and (ii) an investor invests in period t if and only if ~ mt  m
t: Along this equilibrium, the suﬃcient
statistic ~ mt and its variance t can be constructed recursively as functions of (~ mt 1;t 1;mt;xt).
Moreover, as the history gets arbitrarily long, (m
t;t) converges to some time-invariant (m;:)







Hence, up to a monotone transformation, aggregate investment follows a smooth AR(1) process.9
Note then that ﬁctitious data generated by the present model would be virtually indistinguish-
able from ﬁctitious data generated by a canonical unique-equilibrium model. This would not be
the case if we had ignored private sunspots: with public sunspots, aggregate investment features
discrete ﬂuctuations (between 0 and 1), which would be more telling of multiple equilibria. We
conclude that private sunspots can help generate very smooth aggregate ﬂuctuations, making it
diﬃcult to identify ﬂuctuations driven by sunspots from ﬂuctuations driven by smooth changes in
the underlying fundamentals.
“Learning to coordinate.” As another example of the rich dynamics that private sunspots
can sustain, I now consider the following variant. Investors continue to receive the exogenous and
endogenous private signals mt and xt considered above, but no the unobserved sunspot remains
constant over time:  = 1 and u = 0, so that st = s for all t.
As before, we can ﬁnd an equilibrium in which an investor invests in period t if and only if
his suﬃcient statistic ~ mt exceeds some deterministic threshold m
t. For simplicity, suppose  =
c=b = 1=2, which gives m
t = 0 for all t. It follows that aggregate investment in period t is given





: Because of the accumulation of new signals, t is decreasing over time and
converges to zero as t ! 1. It follows that, whenever s > 0, Kt(s) is bounded in (1=2;1) and
increasing over time, asymptotically converging to 1; and whenever s < 0, Kt(s) is bounded inside
(0;1=2); and decreasing over time, asymptotically converging to 0.
! ! 1 avoids this problem by rendering the signal zt uninformative. At the same time, because the expectation of
!t is zero no matter !, investors continue to choose kt so as to maximize their expectation of A(Kt)kt. It follows
that the error introduced by ignoring the information contained in payoﬀs vanishes as ! ! 1.
9To be precise, 
 1(Kt) is a Gaussian AR(1).
10Recall now that K = 1 and K = 0 represent the only two equilibria that are possible in the
absence of private sunspots and that require all investors coordinating on the same course of action.
We can thus interpret the dynamics that obtain here with private sunspots as situations where
investors slowly learn on which action to coordinate: at any given date, some investors are making
the “wrong” investment choice (i.e., do the opposite of what the majority does), but the fraction of
investors who makes such a mistake falls over time and vanishes in the limit.
Also note that this form of learning can be either exogenous or endogenous: it can originate in
either the signals mt regarding the unobserved sunspot s or the signals xt regarding past aggregate
activity. We conclude that private sunspots can capture, not only the idea that agents may fail to
perfectly coordinate on the same course of action, but also the possibility that agents slowly learn
how to do so over time through the observation of one another’s actions.10
4 Private sunspots and ﬁnancial markets
The preceding analysis has been conducted within a simple investment game that abstracted from
market interactions. I now consider a variant model in which investors trade an asset within a com-
petitive ﬁnancial market. This exercise serves two purposes. First, it shows how the insights of the
preceding analysis translate in the context of ﬁnancial markets. Second, it shows how imperfect cor-
relation can be accommodated within a rational-expectations-equilibrium framework, where prices
partially reveal the unobserved common sunspot component that drives the correlation among the
beliefs (the private sunspots) of diﬀerent investors.
Model set-up. There is again a large number of risk-neutral investors, who now decide how
much to trade of a certain ﬁnancial asset. An individual’s investment in the asset is denoted by ki
and the aggregate investment by K: The price of the asset is denoted by p and its dividend by A:
The later is assumed to increase with aggregate investment in the asset: A = A(K). Once again,
this is meant to capture, in a crude way, a variety of feedback eﬀects identiﬁed in prior work.11
10The form of social learning considered here is purely private, but one could easily extend the analysis to public
signals about either s or past activity. A certain kind of public signals that is of special interest is prices; this bring
us to the topic of the next section.
11For example, Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008) argue that the higher the position of institutional investors in the stock
of a particular company, the better the monitoring of the management of that company, and hence the higher return
and the higher the demand for that stock; Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) stress the role of complementarities
among the customers, suppliers, or employees of a company; and many others emphasize feedback eﬀects from stock
prices to capital availability, and therefrom to ﬁrm proﬁtability and back to stock prices.
11Since investors are risk-neutral, their payoﬀs are simply given by
i = (ki;K;p)  [A(K)   p]ki:
To rule out inﬁnite positions, I assume that ki is bounded in [k; k]; for some ﬁnite k and  k: These
bounds can be interpreted as the result of borrowing and short-selling constraints. (Allowing for
risk aversion would be another natural, but less tractable, way to ensure that investors take ﬁnite
positions.) Without any further loss of generality, let k = 0 and  k = 1: Finally, the supply of the
asset, which is denoted by Q; is assumed to be an increasing function of the price and of some
unobserved supply shock: Q = Q(p;u); where u 2 U  R. The shock u can also be interpreted as
the impact of “noise traders”; its sole role is to introduce noise in the price.
Private sunspots are introduced as before: nature ﬁrst draws an unobserved common sunspot
variable s 2 S from some distribution F; nature then sends each agent i a private signal mi 2 M;
which is drawn i.i.d. across agents from a conditional distribution 	: These variables are payoﬀ-
irrelevant and are independent of the supply shock u; they are once again devices that introduce
aggregate and idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty. What is novel here relative to the model of
the previous section is that the price that clears the asset market may publicly reveal information
about these sunspot variables. This motivates the following equilibrium deﬁnition, which introduces
private sunspots within an otherwise-standard rational-expectations equilibrium concept.
Deﬁnition 2 A rational-expectations equilibrium with private sunspots consists of a sunspot struc-
ture (S;F;M;	); a price function P : SR ! R, an individual demand function k : M  R ! [k;  k];
and a belief (c.d.f.)  : S  R  M  R ! [0;1], such that the following hold:
(i) Beliefs are consistent with Bayes rule given the equilibrium price function.
(ii) Given the beliefs and the price function, the demand function satisﬁes individual rationality:




(k;K (s;P (s;u));P (s;u))d(s;ujm;p) 8(m;p);
where K(s;p) 
R
M k(m;p)d	(mjs) 8s 2 S:
(iii) Given the demand function, the price function satisﬁes market-clearing:
K (s;P (s;u)) = Q(s;u) 8(s;u):
12As in most rational-expectations models, the analysis is intractable without an “artful” choice
















is i.i.d. across agents and
independent of both s and u. I further impose the following functional forms for A and Q : A(K) = 1
if K   and A(K) = 0 otherwise, for some scalar  2 (0;1); and Q(p;u) = 
 
u +  1 (p)

; for
some scalar  > 0: This scalar parameterizes the price elasticity of the supply of the asset, while 
denotes again the c.d.f. of the standardized Normal distribution.
Equilibrium analysis. The next proposition establishes the existence of rational-expectations
equilibria in which investors’ demand functions are decreasing in the price and increasing in their
private sunspots. As a result, the aggregate demand for the asset is increasing in s: Along with the
fact that supply is increasing in u; this ensures that the equilibrium price is increasing in both s
and u: Because the supply shock u is unobserved (recall, this shock captures more generally any
noise in prices), the price is only a noise indicator of the underlying common sunspot component s:
This ensures that, although investors do learn something about one another’s’ investment choices
from the observed price, they continue to face some residual idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding one
another’s investment choices, and hence about the eventual dividend of the asset. As a result, these
equilibria feature diﬀerent investors ﬁnding it strictly optimal to make diﬀerent portfolio choices,
even though they all share the same preferences, constraints, and beliefs regarding any exogenous
component of asset returns—heterogeneity in portfolio choices originates merely in self-fulﬁlling
heterogeneity in beliefs regarding the endogenous component of asset returns.
Proposition 3 For any (u;), there exists a rational-expectations with private sunspots in which
the following are true:





1 if m  m (p)
0 otherwise
where m (p) is a continuous increasing function of p: By implication, the aggregate demand for the
asset, K(s;p); is continuously increasing in s and continuously decreasing in p:
(ii) The equilibrium price is given by p = P (s;u); where P is a continuously increasing function
of s and a continuously decreasing function of u:






u > 1. Next,
suppose there exists an m (p) such that an investor invests if and only if m > m (p). Given the
proposed strategy, aggregate demand is given by
K (s;p) = 





Market clearing imposes K (s) = Q(p;u): Equivalently, p must satisfy m (p)+" 1 (p) = s "u;
for all (s;u): Since the function m is common knowledge in equilibrium (and so are ";; and );
the observation of p is informationally equivalent to the observation of the signal
z (p)  m (p) + " 1 (p) = s + n; (5)
where n   "u is Normal noise with variance 2
n = 2
"2
u: Because the prior about s, the private
signal m; and the public signal z are all Gaussian, the posterior about s conditional on m and p is














and variance V ar[sjm;p] = 2
post; where post  ( 2
s + 2
" + 2
n ) 1=2. It follows that the expected
dividend conditional on signal m is
E[Ajm;p] = Pr[K(s;p)  jm;p] = Pr








E[sjm;p]   m (p)   " 1()

By (6), the latter is increasing in m: It follows that an investor ﬁnds it optimal to invest if and only






E[sjm (p);p]   m (p)   " 1()

= p
In any equilibrium, m (p) = m (p): Along with (6), this gives a unique solution for m(p):













1 if m  m (p)
0 otherwise
with m (p) as in (7). By assumption, "post 2
n > 1; which guarantees that m (p) is a contin-
uously increasing in p and hence the equilibrium demand for the asset is continuously decreasing
in p: Along with the fact that the supply of the asset is continuously increasing in p; this also
guarantees that there exists a unique equilibrium price function, p = P (s;u): The latter is found
by substituting m (p) from (7) into (5) and solving for p. Doing so gives
p = P (s;u)  
 















which is continuously increasing in s and continuously decreasing in u: QED
In the equilibria constructed above, the aggregate demand for the asset is globally decreasing
in its price and therefore intersects only once with supply. Moreover, these equilibria feature only
smooth ﬂuctuations in asset prices. This is unlike the backward-bending demand functions, multiple
demand-supply intersections, and discrete price changes (crashes) featured in Angeletos and Werning
(2006), Barlevy and Veronesi (2003), or Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008). Therefore, an outsider could,
once again, fail to detect any obvious symptoms of multiplicity and could fail to identify this model
from a smoother, unique-equilibrium model of the ﬁnancial market.
5 Private sunspots and eﬃciency
In the baseline model of Sections 2 and 3, the best sunspot-less equilibrium (the one in which K = 1)
coincides with the ﬁrst-best allocation. This, however, need not be the case in general. Investment
booms may sometimes be excessive, leading to ineﬃcient bubbles, crowding out of other productive
activities, or having adverse price eﬀects. For any of these reasons, the sunspot-less equilibrium
with high investment (K = 1) may feature ineﬃciently high investment, even if it is it is the best
among all equilibria with no (or only public) sunspots.
In a certain sense, this is precisely the case in the ﬁnancial-market model of Section 4. In that
model, a proper welfare analysis is complicated by the fact that I have assumed an exogenous supply
15of the asset: I have not modeled the “noise traders” that lie behind this supply. We can nevertheless
bypass this complication by focusing on the welfare of the investors that have been modeled—think
of the latter as domestic agents and the ones behind the supply as “unloved” foreigners. Note then
that higher aggregate investment implies a higher price at which the asset can be acquired. As a
result, although domestic investors are better oﬀ in the equilibrium in which K = 1 than the one
in which K = 0, they would have been even better oﬀ if they could somehow coordinate on some
K 2 (;1), for they would have then guaranteed the same rate of return at a lower price.
Whenever there are such ineﬃciencies, it is natural to think about Pigou-like policies that
correct these ineﬃciencies and implement the ﬁrst-best allocation as an equilibrium (although not
necessarily the unique one). Suppose, though, that such policies are unavailable, too costly, or far
from perfect, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper. I will now show how private
sunspots, unlike public sunspots, can then improve welfare.
Towards this goal, consider the following variant of the baseline model. The net return to





1   c   hK if K  
 c   hK if K < 
(8)
where  2 (0; 1
2] and h  0.12 The baseline model is nested with h = 0. Allowing h > 0 introduces
a congestion eﬀect: a negative externality similar to the pecuniary externality featured in Section 4
or, more generally, a source of ineﬃciency in the best sunspot-less equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Suppose h 2
 1 c
2 ;1   c

:
(i) There exist only two sunspot-less equilibria, one with K = 1 and another with K = 0:
(ii) The equilibrium in which K = 1 achieves higher welfare (ex-ante utility) than the equilibrium
in which K = 0; as well as than any equilibrium with public sunspots.
(iii) The ﬁrst-best level of aggregate investment is K 2 [;1):
Proof. Part (i) follows from the fact that A(K) < 0 for all K 2 [0;) and, as long as h < 1 c,
A(K) > 0 for all K 2 [;1]. Now let w(K) denote welfare (ex-ante utility) when the fraction of
agents investing is K: w(K)  K(1;K) + (1   K)(0;K) = KA(K): For part (ii), note that
w(1) = 1   c   h and w(0) = 0; so that the result follows again from the assumption h < 1   c:
Finally, for part (iii), note that w(K) is continuous, strictly decreasing, and strictly concave for
12Letting b = 1 is merely a normalization, while  
1
2 simpliﬁes a step in the proof of Proposition 6.
16K < ; it has an upward jump at K =  (at which point it is right- but not left-continuous); and
thereafter it is again continuous and strictly concave, but possibly non-monotonic. In particular,





> > > <
> > > :
 if 1   c   2h  0
1 c
2h 2 (;1) if 1   c   2h < 0 < 1   c   2h
1 if 1   c   2h  0
(9)
Therefore, K < 1 if and only if h > 1 c
2 . QED
The key result here is that, as long as the congestion eﬀect is not too high (h < 1   c), there
continue to exist exactly two equilibria in the absence of sunspots; but, as long as the congestion
eﬀect is not too low (h > 1 c
2 ), neither equilibrium is ﬁrst-best eﬃcient. That public sunspots can
not improve upon those two equilibria is clear: public sunspots only attain convex combinations of
the welfare levels attained by the two sunspot-less equilibria and they are thus dominated by the
equilibrium in which K = 1. This, however, is not true once we allow for private sunspots.
Proposition 5 Whenever h 2 (1  
p
c;1   c); there exist equilibria with private sunspots that sus-
tain strictly higher welfare than any of the equilibria with no or only public sunspots.
This result can be established with a speciﬁc example. Here, I go one step further by char-
acterizing the best possible equilibrium with private sunspots. This permits me to identify what
equilibrium properties are necessary for eﬃciency when one allows for private sunspots—and then
to contrast them with those that one identiﬁes if one restricts attention to public sunspots.
Proposition 6 Suppose h 2 (1  
p
c;1   c); allow for private sunspots, and consider the set of
equilibria that maximize welfare. There exists a unique pair (q;p), with K < q < 1 and 0 <
p < 1; such that all these equilibria are characterized by the following properties:
(i) K(s) = q with probability p and K(s) = 0 with probability 1 p; that is, the economy ﬂuc-
tuates between “normal times”, events during which aggregate investment is positive, and “crashes”,
events during which investment collapses to zero.
(ii) q and p decrease with c or h; that is, the probability of a crash increases, and the level of
investment in normal times decreases, as fundamentals get worse.
17Proof. By the revelation principle, any equilibrium with private sunspots can be represented
by a c.d.f. F : [0;1] ! [0;1] such as the following hold: ﬁrst, “Nature” draws q from F; next, a
“mediator” sends private messages that say “invest” to a fraction q of the population, while it sends
private messages that say “don’t invest” to the remaining fraction 1   q; ﬁnally, investors ﬁnd it
individually rational to follow the action recommended in their respective messages.13 We can thus
identify the best equilibria by studying the distributions F that maximize welfare (ex-ante utility)
subject to the relevant incentive-compatibility constraints.
Take any F. Let 1 (resp., 0) be the c.d.f. of the posterior about q for an investor who receives






and 0 (q) =
R q
0 (1   q0)dF (q0)
R 1
0 (1   q0)dF (q0)
(10)
For the recommended actions to be incentive-compatible, the expected net return from investing
must be positive conditional on the message “invest” and negative conditional on the message “don’t
invest”:
R 1
0 A(q)d1 (q)  0 and
R 1




w(q)dF (q)  0 and R(F) 
Z 1
0
r(q)dF (q)  0;
where w(q)  qA(q) and r(q)  (1   q)A(q): For any F that satisﬁes these constraints, welfare




[q(1;q) + (1   q)(0;q)]dF (q) =
Z 1
0
w(q)dF (q) = W (F):
The best equilibria are thus identiﬁed by maximizing W(F) subject to W(F)  0  R(F). Clearly,
the set of F that satisfy these constraints is non-empty and the constraint W(F)  0 does not
bind at the optimum. The remainder of the proof thus characterizes the functions F that maximize
W(F) among the set of non-decreasing functions F : [0;1] ! [0;1] that satisfy R(F)  0.
I ﬁrst show that any solution to this problem assigns zero measure to q 2 (0;K). Towards
a contradiction, take any F that violates this property and construct a variation ~ F by letting
~ F (q) = limq!  F (q) for q 2 [0;K) and ~ F (q) = F (q) for q  K; ~ F is thus constructed from F
by reassigning to q = 0 all the mass that F assigns to q 2 [0;) and to q = K all the mass that
13Restricting attention to pure strategies is immaterial because of the continuum of agents.
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Figure 1: The functions w(q)  qA(q) and r(q)  (1   q)A(q)
F assigns to q 2 [;K]; while not aﬀecting the mass assigned to q > K: As illustrated in the left
panel of Figure 1, the function w(q)  qA(q) is continuous and strictly decreasing in q for q < ; it
has an upward jump at q = ; and thereafter it is again continuous and strictly concave, reaching
it’s maximum at q = K 2 [;1): It follows that w(0)  w(q) for all q 2 [0;) and w(K)  w(q)
for all q 2 [;1]: By implication, the variation ~ F improves welfare:
W( ~ F)   W(F) =
Z 
0
[w(0)   w(q)]dF (q) +
Z K

[w(K)   w(q)]dF (q) > 0:
Next, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1, r(q)  (1   q)A(q) is continuous and strictly
increasing in q for q 2 [0;);14 it has an upward jump at q = ; and it is continuous and strictly
decreasing in q for q 2 [;1]: It follows that the variation ~ F relaxes incentive compatibility:
R( ~ F)   R(F) =
Z 
0
[r(0)   r(q)]dF (q) +
Z K

[r(K)   r(q)]dF (q) < 0:
Since the variation ~ F is both feasible and welfare-improving, no F that assigns positive measure to
q 2 (0;K) can be optimal. We conclude that, for any optimal F; there exists a scalar p 2 [0;1]
and a c.d.f. G : [K;1] ! [0;1] such that F (q) = 1   p for q < K and F (q) = (1   p) + pG(q) for
q  K: That is, 1   p is the mass assigned to q = 0, p is the mass assigned to q  K; and G is
the distribution of q conditional on q  K: It then also follows that
W (F) = (1   p)w(0) + p
Z 1
K




14That r(q) is increasing for all q 2 [0;) is guaranteed by the assumption that   1=2 and holds more generally
as long as c + h(1   2)  0:
19Consider now the subproblem of choosing G for given p 2 (0;1]. This is the same as maximizing
~ W (G) subject to ~ R(G)  b(p); where ~ W (G) 
R 1
K w(q)dG(q); ~ R(G) 
R 1
K r(q)dG(q); and
b(p)   (1   p)r(0)=p: Because this is a convex optimization problem, there exists a Lagrange
multiplier ^ p  0 such that the optimal G solves maxG
R 1
K[w(q)   ^ pr(q)]dG(q): But now note
that, for any ^ p  0; the function w(q) ^ pr(q) is continuous and strictly concave in q over [K;1];
and therefore there exists a unique ^ qp such that ^ qp = argmaxq2[K;1][w(q)  ^ pr(q)]; which in turn
implies that the optimal G assigns all measure to q = ^ qp: We can thus identify any optimal F with
a pair (^ p; ^ q) 2 [0;1]  [K;1] that maximizes ^ W(^ p; ^ q)  (1   ^ p)w(0) + ^ pw(^ q) subject to
^ R(^ p; ^ q)  (1   ^ p)r(0) + ^ pr(^ q)  0: (11)
Note that the constraint (11) must bind: if it did not, the optimum would be (^ p; ^ q) = (1;K);
but then (11) would be violated, since r(K) = (1   K)A(K) > 0: Thus, let  > 0 be the
Lagrange multiplier associated with (11). Using the fact that w(0) = 0 and r(0) = A(0) =  c; the
ﬁrst-order conditions for ^ q and ^ p reduce to the following:
w0 (q)   r0(q)
8
> > > <
> > > :
 0 if q = K
= 0 if q 2 (K;1)
 0 if q = 1
w(q)   [r(q) + c]
8
> > > <
> > > :
 0 if p = 0
= 0 if p 2 (0;1)
 0 if p = 1
(12)
Recall that r0 (q) < 0 for all q 2 [K;1]. Together with w0 (K) = 0 and  > 0, this rules out
q = K: If p = 1; (11) implies q = 1: But then the left part of (12) gives w(1)    [r(1) + c] 
0; or equivalently   (1   c   h)=c; while the right part of (12) gives w0 (1)   r0 (1)  0;
or equivalently    (1   c   2h)=(1   c   h): Hence, p = 1 is possible only if q = 1 and
 (1   c   2h)=(1   c   h)  (1   c   h)=c; the latter in turn holds if and only if c  (1   h)
2 : If
instead p < 1; then (11) gives r(q) = c(1   p)=p > 0, which guarantees that q < 1 and, along






















Note then that this solution satisﬁes q < 1 and p < 1 if and only if c > (1   h)2; or equivalently
h > 1  
p
c; if instead h  1  
p
c, the optimum is attained with q = 1 and p = 1: QED









Figure 2: Comparative statics of best private-sunspot equilibrium.
This result establishes that the best equilibrium with private sunspots has the economy alter-
nating between “normal times”, i.e., states during which a large fraction of the population invests,
and “crashes”, i.e., states during which nobody invests. From the perspective of the pertinent liter-
ature, this seems quite paradoxical: the occurrence of a crash is considered prima-facia evidence of
a coordinate failure, for the best equilibrium with no or only public sunspots would never feature
a crash. The key to this apparent paradox is the incentive eﬀect that the possibility of a crash
has during normal times. In particular, the fact that that many but not all investors invest during
normal times contributes towards higher welfare than in the best sunspot-less equilibrium: the level
of investment during normal times is now closer to the ﬁrst-best level. However, for certain indi-
viduals to have an incentive not to invest during normal times, it must be that these individuals
believe that a crash will take place with suﬃciently high probability, while many other individuals
believe the opposite. In turn, such heterogeneity in beliefs is possible in equilibrium only if crashes
do happen with positive probability, which explains the result.
To further illustrate the economics behind the determination of the best equilibrium, Figure 2
considers its comparative statics with respect to c; the comparative statics with respect to h are
similar. The dashed line gives p; while the solid line gives q: For comparison, the dotted lined gives
K; the ﬁrst-best level of investment . Note that q > K always, that p < 1 and q < 1 as soon
as 1  
p
c < h; and that thereafter both p and q decrease with c: In words, as the fundamentals
worsen, so that the ﬁrst-best level of investment falls, the equilibrium level of investment during
normal times also falls, and the probability of a crash increases. This is true even though the best
sunspot-less equilibrium is invariant with the fundamentals.
216 Conclusion
The pertinent literature on macroeconomic complementarities and endogenous ﬂuctuations has fo-
cused on aggregate extrinsic uncertainty. In this paper I introduced idiosyncratic extrinsic uncer-
tainty and showed how this can lead to novel positive and normative implications.
In one sense, the private sunspots considered in this paper capture the idea that agents face
uncertainty about which equilibrium is played: each individual does not know what is the action
upon which other agents are trying to coordinate.15 In another sense, they capture idiosyncratic
variation in investor sentiment: diﬀerent agents hold diﬀerent expectations regarding the endogenous
prospects of the economy. These possibilities were absent from previous work: in equilibria with
public sunspots, all agents share the same beliefs about endogenous outcomes, face no uncertainty
about what other investors are doing, and play the same action.
The heterogeneity of beliefs regarding endogenous economic outcomes obtained in this paper
does not not require any heterogeneity in information about exogenous economic fundamentals, nor
any deviation from Bayesian rationality. Rather, it obtains as a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium property.
Furthermore, it sustains signiﬁcant heterogeneity in choices even in the absence of any heterogeneity
in primitive characteristics. It can thus show up as signiﬁcant “residual” variation in any econometric
exercise that attempts to explain the observed heterogeneity in investment or portfolio choices on
the basis of heterogeneity in individual characteristics such as wealth, risk aversion, or information
regarding economic fundamentals. At the same time, it can sustain richer and smoother aggregate
ﬂuctuations, possibly making it easier for this class of models to match aggregate data and harder
for an econometrician to detect the underlying multiplicity of equilibria.
Another intriguing possibility is that, with private sunspots, social learning can regard endoge-
nous coordination rather that exogenous fundamentals. In particular, asset prices or data about
aggregate activity may facilitated better predictability of the endogenous prospects of the economy
and better coordination among agents, even if there is nothing to be learned from them regarding
the exogenous economic fundamentals.16
15In this respect, the paper also relates to the recent work on global games (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001; Angeletos
and Werning, 2006). This literature introduces heterogeneous information regarding the fundamentals and studies
how the resulting strategic uncertainty aﬀects equilibrium outcomes, in certain cases selecting a unique equilibrium.
In contrast, private sunspots accommodate strategic uncertainty without obstructing equilibrium multiplicity. An
interesting question is how the two sources of strategic uncertainty may interact if one introduces private sunspots
in global games with multiple equilibria.
16The role of prices in facilitating coordination has also been emphasized in Angeletos and Werning (2006); in their
context, however, this is only because prices serve as a public signal regarding underlying unobserved fundamentals.
22Finally, private sunspots unrest the conventional wisdom regarding the normative properties of
environments with coordination problems. In certain cases, occasional investment crashes may be
necessary for facilitating idiosyncratic uncertainty and thereby improving eﬃciency during normal
times. When this is the case, what looks ex post as a coordination failure is actually contributing
towards higher ex-ante welfare; and policies aimed at preventing such apparent coordination failures
may backﬁre by eliminating a social mechanism that improves eﬃciency during normal times.
All these insights are evidently relevant for a wide class of models in macroeconomics that
feature complementarities. However, the present paper delivered these insights only within two
highly stylized representatives of this class of models. Embedding the analysis within richer micro-
founded models remains an open direction for future research.
Appendix: dynamics and learning
Consider the dynamic extension of Section 3. The sunspot st follows an AR(1): st+1 = st + ut;
with ut  N(0;u); s1  N(0;s); and s = u
1 . The private signals are given by mt = st + "t
and xt =  1 (Kt)+t; with "t  N(0;") and t  N(0;): Let u   2
u ;    2
 ; "   2
" :
Proposition 7 There exists a sequence fm
t;tg1
t=0 and an equilibrium such that (i) the private
information of an investor at t with respect to st is summarized in a suﬃcient statistic ~ mt that is
Normal with mean st and variance 2
t, and (ii) an investor invests at t if and only if ~ mt  m
t:
Proof. The proof is by induction. The result trivially holds at t = 1; since the ﬁrst period coincides







xt+1 = 1 p
t(st   m
t) + t+1; where t   2
t ; so that xt+1 is eﬀectively a Gaussian signal about st
with precision t: It follows that the private information regarding st+1 can be summarized in a


















t+1 =  (t) 
2u(1 + )t
u + (1 + )t
+ ": (15)
23But then, by a similar argument as in Proposition 2, it is indeed a continuation equilibrium that an




















which proves that the result holds at t + 1 and completes the induction argument.
Now note that, for any  2 (0;1) and any ﬁnite (u;;"); the function  () is strictly
increasing and strictly concave, with  (0) > 0. It follows that (i) there exists a unique  > 0 such
that  =  () and (ii) the sequence ftg1
t=0 converges to this ﬁxed point for any initial 0 > 0.
This proves the claim that, as the history becomes inﬁnitely long, both m
t and t converge.
Finally, consider the variant with learning over a constant underlying sunspot (st = s for all t).
This is nested with  = 1 and u = 1; in which case (15) reduces to t+1 =  (t) = (1+)t+": It
is then immediate that t decreases monotonically over time and asymptotes to 0 as t ! 1. Finally,
letting  = c=b = 1=2 into (16) gives m
t = 0 for all t, as claimed in the main text.
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